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STEMMING THE TIDE OF LENDER LIABILITY: JUDICIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE REACTIONS
I.

NAVIGATING THE WATERS OF LENDER LIABILITY

Banks and lending institutions have recently found themselves engulfed in a wave of lender liability actions. Troubled borrowers have
successfully turned to the doctrine of lender liability to assert their legal
rights. Fraud,' breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing, 2 breach of the fiduciary duty, 3 liability for excessive control re1. See Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 309 Minn. 362, 244 N.W.2d 648 (1976)
(Banks have a moral duty to the community in which they do business, and a bank which
had actual knowledge of the fraudulent activities of one of its depositors was under an
affirmative duty to disclose this knowledge before making a loan in furtherance of the
fraud.); Farah Mfg. v. State Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (The lenders'
statements implied that they would declare default on the loan if the former chief executive officer of the corporate borrower were reinstated. A default declaration would result
in the borrower's bankruptcy. Such statements established a claim of fraud for injuries
arising from a promise which was not intended to be performed.). See also Barrett v. Bank
of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986) (lender liable to third party
guarantor on theory of constructive fraud when the court found a special relationship of
trust and confidence). Compare Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d
1235 (1982) (Absent a fiduciary relationship between the borrower and the bank, constructive fraud did not exist on the part of the bank in allegedly failing to make full disclosure of the financial involvement of the dealership owner with the bank.).
2. See Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust, 757
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (The lender was held liable for breach of the good faith obligation for discontinuing the borrower's financing without prior notice and thereby preventing the borrower from finding alternative financing. The court further determined that
good faith extends not only to the decision of whether or not to advance funds, but also to
the power to demand repayment.); Alaska Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska
1983). See also Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,
209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985) (bank liable in tort for bad faith refusal to compensate depositor
for funds negligently paid from depositor's account for a check that had been reported
stolen); Farah Mfg., 678 S.W.2d at 661 (parties to a loan agreement are required to exercise good faith in their representations to each other). But see Spencer Co. v. Chase
Manhatten Bank, 81 Bankr. 194 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (court expressly rejects Irving
Trust, rules that the obligation of good faith does not extend to a demand note).
See generally Blakeboro and Heeseman, Good Faith Duties and Tort Remedies in Lender Liability Litigation, 15 WESTERN STATE UNIV. L. REV. 617 (1988); West and Haggerty, The "Demandable" Note and the Obligation of Good Faith, 21 U.C.C. L.J. 99 (1988); Note, Extending The
Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts, 65 B.U.L. REV. 355 (1985); Note, Tort
Remedies For Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing Into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1986); Comment,
Lender Liability For Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance, 36 EMORY L. J. 917
(1987); Comment, Good Faith Theories of Lender Liability, 48 LA. L. REv. 1181 (1988); Note,
Lender Liability: Breach of Good Faith in Lending and Related Theories, 64 N.D.L. REV. 273
(1988); Note, K.M.C. v Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary Financing and the Implied Duty of Good
Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 539 (1987); Note, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank:
California's Newest Extension of Bad Faith Litigation Into Commercial Law, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 645
(1986); Comments, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in a Noninsurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 893 (1986); Recent Development, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
Loose Canons of Liability for Financial Institutions, 40 VAND. L. REV. (1987).
3. See Deist v. Wachholz, 208 Mont. 207, 678 P.2d 188 (1984) (debtor and creditor
relationship between bank and its customer does not usually give rise to fiduciary responsibilities, however, when bank officer and customer share a relationship of reposed trust
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suiting in the finding of a principal-agent relationship, 4 interference, 5
duress, 6 negligence, 7 misrepresentation 8 and breach of contract 9 are exand confidence, the bank officer who renders financial advice takes on the role of a fiduciary). See also Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (lst Cir. 1987) (While adhering to the majority
view that a fiduciary relationship can arise in certain situations, the court noted a split
between those courts that refuse to find a fiduciary relationship in the lender-borrower
context and those that prescribe to the majority view that a fiduciary relationship in the
lender-borrower context may arise in certain situations.).
But see In re Teltronics Services, 29 Bankr. 139, 169-70 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (This
case shows judicial reluctance to find a fiduciary relationship between a creditor and a
debtor: "A creditor is not ordinarily a fiduciary of either his debtor or fellow creditors, and
owes them no special obligation of fidelity in the collection of his claim ....
[A] creditor
normally has an unqualified right to call a loan when due, to refuse to extend a loan for
any cause or no cause at all, and to lawfully enforce collection."); accord In re W.T. Grant,
699 F.2d 599 (2d. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822.
See generally Cappello and Komorske, Fiduciary Relationships Between Lenders and Borrowers: Maintenance of the Status Quo, 15 WESTERN STATE UNIV. L. REV. 579 (1988); Miller and
Calfo, The Fiduciary Duty of Lenders Through Excessive Involvement or Control Over Borrowers in
Lender Liability Cases, LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 187
(Practicing Law Institute 1988). Comment, The Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary
Principles Into the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 795
(1987).
4. See In re American Lumber, 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr., D. Minn. 1980) (lender's claim
equitably subordinated to the claims of other unsecured creditors because of the lender's
use of its power as a controlling creditor); A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309
N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981) (The creditor was found to be an active participant in the
debtor's operations and was thus subject to the following rule: "[a] creditor who assumes
control of his debtor's business for the mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the debtor in connection
with the business." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14-0 (1958)); Farah Mfg. v.
State Nat'l Bank, 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
See generally DeNatale, The Importance of the Issue of Control in Lender Liability Cases,
LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 149 (Practicing Law Institute
1988); Fortgang, Novikoff & Feintuch, Creditors'Controlof Debtors- Elements and Consequences
of Lender Control, I LENDER LIABILITY DEFENSE AND PREVENTION (American Law InstituteAmerican Bar Association 1987); Haas, Insights into Lender Liability: An Argument For Treating
Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321 (1987); Lundgren,
Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship With Its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1984).
5. Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984) (court found
that bank's actions in requiring corporate borrower's president to take a 50% reduction in
salary, replacing the corporate accountant with one chosen by the bank, and a 13 point
memorandum prepared by the bank to salvage the corporate borrower were sufficient evidence to bring a claim of tortious interference to the jury); Farah Mfg., 678 S.W.2d at 661
(court expanded the traditional concept of tortious interference beyond protecting specific
contracts or prospective contracts to include the corporate governance process).
6. See Pecos Constr. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969)
(mortgagee liable to mortgagor for duress because of mortgagee's refusal to provide financing coupled with its refusal to release its financing commitment to another lender in
the wake of the mortgagor's fear of economic loss); FarahMfg., 678 S.W.2d at 661 (actionable duress may exist when one enforces or threatens to enforce legal rights in bad faith or
acts oppressively to further his own economic interests by implying that loan would be
called if former chief executive officer resumed management). But see F.D.I.C. v. Linn, 671
F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (Economic duress was not available to the borrowers as a
defense to an action brought against them to collect on a note and guarantees or as a
counterclaim against the lender, since, under Illinois law, the lenders were entitled to extract substantial concessions from borrowers on renegotiation of the note.).
7. See Brunswick Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(lender liable for negligently failing to service a loan properly); First Nat'l City Bank v.
Gonzalez, 293 F.2d 919 (1st Cir. 1961) (lender liable for negligently failing to post loan
payments to borrower's account); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Caudle, 425 So.2d 1050
(Ala. 1982) (lender held liable for negligently failing to inform borrowers that their loan
had been approved); Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr.
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amples of the "plain vanilla" types of common law theories that borrowers and third party creditors have successfully asserted under the
auspices of lender liability.
The umbrella of lender liability extends beyond traditional common
law principles and into the statutory arena. Violations of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code, the federal securities laws, tax and wage laws, and
state consumer fraud statutes also are potential weapons within the borrower's arsenal.' 0 Other statutory claims against lenders have been premised under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO") I and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968) (lender liable for negligently failing to properly supervise a construction project it was funding); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756
(1986) (lender liable for negligent failure to process a loan application); Davis v. Nevada
Nat'l Bank, 103 Nev. 220, 737 P.2d 503 (1987) (lender liable for negligently disbursing
funds); Walters v. First Nat'l Bank, 69 Ohio St. 2nd 677, 433 N.E.2d 608 (1982) (lender
liable for negligently failing to obtain insurance required by the borrower).
8. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771 (7th
Cir. 1985) (bank liable for misrepresentations, upon which third party financing company
justifiably relied, concerning the financial condition of an automobile dealership); Central
States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1984) (lender liable
for misrepresentations made by bank's vice-president with respect to financial stability of
bank's customer as the vice-president was under a duty to disclose facts suggesting the
customer's financial instability); Accord In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc.
1984). See also Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 38 Cal. 3d 892, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679, 701
P.2d 826 (1985) (punitive damages appropriate against bank which fraudulently induced
customers to assign accounts receivable in exchange for promise to fund future financing
when batik knew ahead of time that it would not extend further loans to customer's
business).
9. See Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987)
(lender liable for breach of oral agreement to extend credit when bank had previously
financed another of borrower's projects in the same manner); National Farmers Org., Inc.
v. Kinsley Bank, 731 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1984) (lender liable for oral promise of bank
president and shareholder, who had authority to bind bank to make the loan, despite the
fact that the loan exceeded the legal limits imposed by Kansas law); Shaughnessy v. Mark
Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. App. 1986) (lender liable for failure to loan where
the facts indicated that despite the absence of an express agreement, an irrevocable line of
credit was established which obliged the bank, barring default, to provide the necessary
financing).
10. Blair, Lender Liability: New Rules in High Finance, American Banker, January 8, 1987,
at 4. See generally Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability: TowardA Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J.
775, 783-88 & nn.42-46 (1986) (summary of how other federal statutes such as the federal
securities laws may apply to suits against lenders).
11. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 and Supp. 1989). Despite RICO's original
intent to strike at organized crime, it has been a particularly potent weapon in lender
liability litigation because of its treble damage provision. The notion of paying triple the
damages awarded by the court has forced many lenders to settle claims which normally
would have been fought with vigor. However, proposed legislation attempting to limit
lender liability is a source of hope to lenders. The RICO Reform Act of 1989 "was introduced in both houses in February [1989] by a bipartisan quintet of legislators, and strong
backing is expected from the Bush administration." Should Lenders Sit inJudgement?; Bankers
Support Reform of Federal Racketeering Law, American Banker, March 28, 1989, at 6. While
still permitting treble damages in a suit arising from a lender's felony conviction, the
RICO Reform Act would limit the awards in other types of cases to the actual damages
incurred rather than the treble-damage payouts that threaten banks and force lenders to
settle rather than defend themselves in a jury trial. Id.
See generally Kahn and Gentry, Recent Developments in Lender Liability under RICO, Sherman

Antitrust Act, and Bank Company Holding Act,
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367 (Practicing Law Institute 1988); Lobenfeld, Lender Liability Litigation
Recent Developments: Claims Under Federal Law - RICO, Antitrust, Bank Holding Company Act,
DEVELOPMENTs
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12

Despite this apparent flood of litigation directed at the financial
community, in which borrowers have been victorious under a myriad of
legal theories, there are signs that the tide may be shifting in favor of the
lender. This article provides an analysis of the recent appellate court
decisions in Penthouse Internationalv. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Association,13 Kruse v. Bank of America, 14 and Gillman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank. 15 Collectively, these cases have instilled in lenders a guarded
sense of optimism leading them to believe that following sound commercial lending policies will tip the scales of justice in their favor. In
addition, this article will address significant statutory reforms at the state
LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION 1988: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 271 (Practicing Law Institute
1988).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (West 1981 and Supp. 1989). Indeed, the environmental arena has been projected as the new frontier for lender liability litigation. Lenders are
increasingly finding themselves liable for clean-up costs relating to contaminated property
over which they have exercised too much control or which they own through foreclosure.
See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (lender who
takes title at foreclosure sale is liable for cleanup of hazardous waste discovered after foreclosure sale); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) § 20994, (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (In recognizing a distinction between parties who are involved in the actual
operation of a contaminated facility and those who are involved in the financial aspects of
the business conducted at the facility, the court held that a lender who involves himself in
the borrower's operations may be liable.).
But see United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988) (The
secured lender disposed of repossessed collateral as a measure to protect its security interest. This did not give rise to ownership or operator status. Therefore, the lender was not
held liable for hazardous cleanup costs.). CERCLA provides an exception for lenders who
have not participated in the management of the facility and whose interest is merely an
indicia of ownership to protect a security interest in the facility. Thus, unless it can be
shown that the lender has exercised actual control over the contaminated facility, there can
be no liability under CERCLA. Bill To Be Introduced To Clarify Duties Under CERCLA Innocent
Landowner Defense, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA),'No. 10, at 817 (Apr. 10, 1989).
CERCLA also provides an "innocent land owner" defense for those real estate purchasers or lenders who have made "all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership
and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an
effort to minimize liability." Id. Because the language concerning the "innocent land
owner" defense is vague, there is currently draft legislation to clarify the duties of a lender
who forecloses on property in order to escape liability for a hazardous waste site. In an
attempt to determine what measures a lender must take to avoid liability, proponents of
the legislation hope that "[t]he bill will give fuller definition to the scope and amount of
investigation required of an owner or operator of real estate under the innocent landowner defense contained in [CERCLAI." Id. The success of borrowers, however, in expanding CERCLA to hold lenders liable for environmental damage in cases like Maryland
Trust and Mirabile demonstrates the likelihood that lenders will continue to confront claims
under this expanding theory of lender liability.
See generally Klotz and Siakotos, Lender Liability Under Federal and State Environmental
Law: Of Deep Pockets, Debt Defeat and Deadbeats, 92 CoM. L. J. 275 (1987); Tyler, Emerging
Theories of Lender Liability in Texas, 24 Hous. L. REV. 411 (1987); Gillon, Lender Liability Under
CERCLA: The Impact of Fleet Factors, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 12, at 698 (Mar. 20, 1989);
Avoidance Techniques: JI'hat Constitutes Control Sufficient to Establish Liability for Environmental
Cleanup?, 2 Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont), No. 6, at 2 (Dec. 1988);
Rash of Lender Liability Suits Seen PeakingAs Lenders Adjust, 49 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 7, at
310 (Aug. 17, 1987).
13. 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied.
14. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989).
15. 73 N.Y.2d 1, 534 N.E.2d 824, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1988).
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level which are designed to limit the ability of borrowers to bring lawsuits against lenders.
II.

A.

CASES REVERSING THE TIDE OF LENDER LIABILITY

Penthouse International v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan
Association

In Penthouse Internationalv. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Association 16 ("Penthouse") the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that Dominion Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Dominion") was not liable for anticipatory breach of a loan commitment to
Penthouse International, Ltd. ("Borrower"). 17 The court further held
that neither Dominion nor its legal counsel engaged in fraud. 18 As a
result, the court vacated the staggering $129 million judgment that had
been awarded to Borrower.' 9
1.

Facts

On or about June 20, 1983, Borrower entered into a $97 million
written loan commitment with Queen City Savings & Loan Association
("Queen City") for construction and permanent financing in connection
with a hotel and casino project in Atlantic City, NewJersey. By its terms,
the loan commitment was to expire 120 days after the original June 20,
1983, commitment date, unless mutually extended in writing by Queen
City. Upon expiration of the loan commitment, Queen City was to have
no further obligation to Borrower other than refunding any origination
fees which were received from Borrower. Despite its status as lead
lender, Queen City retained only $7 million of the loan and conditioned
closing upon Borrower getting other lenders to contribute $90 million
to make up the difference. Lending institutions which decided to participate in the loan syndicate were required to enter into a Loan Participation Sale and Trust Agreement ("participation agreement").
Dominion was one of thirteen financial institutions to participate in the
loan syndicate and committed $35 million - double its legal lending
limit 16.

to the transaction.

20

855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1639 (1989).

17. Id. at 983.
18. Id. at 987.
19. Id.
20. Dominion was able to sell $17.5 million of its original $35 million interest in the
loan syndicate to Community Savings and Loan Association ("Community"). Community
initially demonstrated reluctance in joining the project. After expiration of the loan commitment, Community withdrew its $17.5 million interest from the loan syndicate. There
was a factual difference between the district court finding and the court of appeals finding
as to when Community withdrew its interest from the loan syndicate. The district court
concluded that Community withdrew its interest prior to the loan commitment expiration
date and that therefore Dominion "was in the awkward position of having committed itself
to lend more than the amount it was legally permitted to lend." Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The district court thus
concluded that Dominion had no choice other than to "withdraw from its commitment or
breach its agreement." Id.
The court of appeals rejected the district court's finding as to the timing of Commu-
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The loan commitment imposed a number of preclosing requirements upon Borrower before Queen City would be obligated to provide
the financing. Borrower was required to provide an "insurable first
mortgage lien on the project, copies of contracts with the architects and
major trade contractors, evidence that all utilities required for the development would be available, and evidence that satisfactory alternate licensing arrangements were available if [Borrower] failed to obtain the
'2 1
required license to operate a casino."
Neither the loan commitment nor the participation agreement provided that Queen City was authorized by the other participating lenders
to waive Borrower's compliance with any of the preclosing requirements. Furthermore, the participation agreement stipulated that Queen
City would serve as a trustee with fiduciary duties in protecting the
rights of the other participating lenders. The participation agreement
also contained an integration clause preventing modification except by
written agreement and a clause designating New Jersey law as the governing law. There was never a separate written agreement between Bor22
rower and Dominion concerning the financing of the transaction.
On November 21, 1983, Borrower and Queen City agreed to extend the expiration date of the loan commitment to December 1, 1983.
After negotiation as to the timing of the loan closing between Borrower,
Dominion, and Queen City, a letter dated November 21, 1983, ambiguously recited that Borrower and Queen City agreed to "close th[e] loan
''
no earlier than February 1, 1984 or later than March 1, 1984. 23

Once the loan syndicate was complete, Borrower and Queen City
focused on closing the deal which required satisfaction of the preclosing
conditions. Discussions took place in a series of informal status meetings at which only representatives of Borrower and Queen City were
present. Neither Dominion nor any of the other loan syndicate participants attended these meetings. The significance of the meetings was
that Borrower sought to arrange substitute performance rather than
comply with the required preclosing conditions. Without seeking Dominion's consent for a waiver of Borrower's full compliance with any of
the preclosing conditions, Queen City allowed Borrower to proceed toward closing because it was satisfied that the transaction could close
based on Borrower's proffered substitute performance in lieu of the
24
preclosing requirements.
nity's withdrawal from the loan syndicate. "[W]e also reject the court's finding regarding
the timing of Community's withdrawal ....
[T]here is no evidence of Community's withdrawal prior to its March 20th letter." Penthouse Int'l, 855 F.2d at 986-87. As will be explained later, the significance of this determination is that the court of appeals found the
loan commitment to expire on March i, 1984, and that therefore, since Community withdrew after the expiration of the Loan Commitment there was no motive for Dominion to
make an anticipatory breach of its commitment prior to March 20, 1984.
21. The Penthouse Reversal, 2 Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont),
No. 5, at I (Nov. 1988).
22. Penthouse nt '1, 855 F.2d at 968.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Prior to the preclosing meeting, Borrower's outside counsel for the
loan transaction received a letter from a title insurance company revealing that title problems would prevent Borrower from conveying the
mortgage security required by the loan commitment. Furthermore,
there were encumbrances on certain leases that would prevent Borrower
from complying with preclosing conditions unless negotiations could re2 5
sult in a discharge or subordination of the existing interests.
The preclosing meeting was held on February 9, 1984. Dominion
and its counsel, Philip Gorelick ("Gorelick"), of Melrod, Redman & Gartla, P.C. ("Melrod Firm") were present. After reviewing the draft loan
documentation, Gorelick determined that "the loan transaction was not
in a position to close, explaining that, in light of the unresolved title
problems, problems with the leases, the unfulfilled status of some of the
preclosing conditions and the inadequacy of the draft loan documents,
he could not advise his client to proceed."'2 6 Gorelick also was tactless
in conveying his belief to Queen City and others that the whole deal had
to be overhauled. To alleviate his concerns, Queen City agreed to allow
Gorelick to prepare appropriate closing documents and to review the
preclosing requirements in order to close the deal. With respect to the
problem leases at issue, Gorelick proposed amendments to the lease
which he described as being "required" in order to have the leases
properly prepared for closing. 2 7 However, when these amendments
were sent to Borrower, a cover letter by a partner at the Melrod Firm
"indicated that the proposed amendments reflected a 'nearly final version of what the lender will be looking for .... .. 28
Shortly before March 1, 1984, Gorelick indicated to Borrower that
the loan commitment expiration date should be extended. Borrower
rebuffed this suggestion, believing instead that the loan commitment
could not expire unless and until it was presented with the closing documents. After trying to replace Queen City as the lead lender, Dominion
sent Borrower a letter on March 22, 1984, lobbying for a specific construction company that Borrower did not want, as well as demanding
that Borrower implement a formal hotel management program. After
receiving this letter, Borrower broke off communication with Dominion.
On March 20, 1984, the loan syndicate collapsed as participating lenders
believed that the loan commitment had expired on March 1, 1984. Borrower was unsuccessful in finding alternative financing and brought suit
against Dominion claiming anticipatory breach of its loan commitment.
Borrower also sued the Melrod Firm for fraud in connection with the
transaction.
2.

District Court Opinion

The district court held that Dominion's conduct amounted to an
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 969.
Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.
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anticipatory breach of the loan agreement. 29 The court analyzed the
anticipatory breach issue by stating that "[w]here a party to a contract
indicates its refusal to perform unless entirely new or different conditions are first met, then it has breached the agreement."' 30 The court
considered the following factors dispositive in its finding that Dominion's actions amounted to an unambiguous refusal to close, constituting
an anticipatory breach: 1) Gorelick's demand that Borrower obtain
amendments to the problem lease; 2) Dominion's insistence that a hotel
management agreement be entered into prior to closing; 3) Dominion's
demand that Borrower hire a specific construction company; and 4) Dominion's insistence that it replace Queen City as lead lender. 3 '
Responding to Dominion's argument that there could be no anticipatory breach because Borrower was not in a position to close as of
March 1, 1984, the court determined (without making any findings as to
Queen City's authority to waive any preclosing conditions on behalf of
Dominion) that "all of the conditions precedent had been met, waived,
or were in a position to have been met by the date set for closing the
32
loan."
The court also held that the Melrod Firm engaged in active fraud.
Despite a proposed judgment submitted by Borrower which sought $1.7
million against the Melrod Firm, the district court sua sponte amended
the proposal to hold the firm joint and severally liable for the full $129
million.
3.

Second Circuit Opinion

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's holdings that Dominion anticipatorily breached its loan commitment and that the Melrod
Firm engaged in active fraud. Unlike the flamboyant language that characterized the district court's opinion, 3 3 the tenor of the court of appeals'
decision was marked by a return to the traditional principles of contract
law.
a.

Reversing the Anticipatory Breach Claim Against Dominion

The Second Circuit found that March 1, 1984, was the date upon
which the loan commitment expired by its own terms. The court read
the expiration date clause of the loan commitment together with the
clause relating to the closing date and determined that the parties must
29.

Penthouse Int'l v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.

1987), modified, 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1639 (1989).
30. Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 311.
32. Id. at 310.
33. The following illustrates the colorful language that prevailed throughout the district court's opinion: "Gorelick took the stand and attempted brazenly to lie to the court.
During cross-examination, the crucible of truth, Gorelick continuously shifted uneasily in

the chair, sweated like a trapped liar, and the glaze that came over his shifty eyes gave
proof of his continuing perjury. His total lAck of veracity was shown not only by his demeanor but by the shady practices he seemingly reveled in." Penthouselnt t, 665 F. Supp. at
306 n. 1.
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have intended to extend the expiration date of the loan commitment to
March 1, 1984. "Any other construction of these documents would
leave the parties agreeing to close the loan after the commitment had
expired which would make no sense."13 4 The Second Circuit emphasized the primacy of the written document over informal conduct between the parties. "[W]e simply construe the terms of relatively
unambiguous documents. The parties bargained for a loan commitment
that remained open only for a stated duration and we are not at liberty
to construe that agreement in a manner inconsistent with its clear
language. "35

Having determined that the loan commitment expired by its own
terms on March 1, 1984, the Second Circuit held that Dominion could
not be liable for anticipatory breach of contract for actions it took after
that date.3 6 Of the four factors that the district court found as evidence
of an anticipatory breach, the only one that took place before March 1,
1984, was the demand for amendments to the defective leases. The Second Circuit thereafter determined that Dominion could be liable for anticipatory breach only if there were " 'a clear and unequivocal declaration'
that 'the agreed upon performance would not be forthcoming.' ,,37 The
court found that Gorelick's action with respect to the defective leases
did not meet the "clear and unequivocal" refusal to perform standard.3 8
Furthermore, Gorelick's conduct at the preclosing meeting, in which he
was reluctant to proceed with the loan transaction until the title
problems affecting the Lender's mortgage lien were resolved, was
deemed to be a reasonable course of action thereby precluding an antic3
ipatory breach claim.

9

In a further rejection of the district court's findings, the Second Circuit again relied on familiar contract doctrine noting that to successfully
sustain an anticipatory breach claim "the plaintiff must demonstrate that
it had the willingness and ability to perform 'before the repudiation and
that the plaintiff would have rendered the agreed performance if the defendant had not repudiated.' "40 The district court found that Borrower
was in a position to perform because Queen City had effectively waived
the preclosing requirements. The Second Circuit looked to the loan
commitment and the participation agreement and concluded that
"although Queen City had the final word on whether the preclosing conditions had been satisfied, [Borrower] nevertheless was required to sat'4 1
isfy each of the preclosing conditions."
In addition, Queen City was not empowered to waive Borrower's
compliance with the preclosing conditions, nor was it empowered to
34. Penthouse Int'/, 855 F.2d at 976.
35. Id.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 977.
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
at 978-79.
at 979 (citing 4A.
at 980.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 978,

at 925 (1951)).
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modify the terms or conditions of the participation agreement without
obtaining Dominion's approval. 42 In its conclusion that Queen City
could not waive Borrower's preclosing requirements in favor of substitute performance without first obtaining Dominion's approval, the court
was persuaded by an amicus curiae filed by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board ("FHLBB").
The FHLBB advanced several public policy arguments limiting the
lead lender's ability to modify essential terms of an agreement without
consulting the other participating lenders. The court properly noted
that the FHLBB's policy considerations would not be binding if parties
to a loan transaction were to agree to give the lead lender this authority.
However, it is apparent that the court was also impressed by the thrust
of the FHLBB argument that "[a] savings and loan association's independently and prudently underwritten participation in a loan could be
changed into an entirely reckless act if fundamental terms and conditions of the loan are altered prior to closing by the lead lender on its
' 43
own initiative and without consulting the participant.
b.

Reversing the Fraud Claim Against Melrod Firm

The Second Circuit found that the district court made its decision
to hold the Melrod Firm jointly and severally liable sua sponte for active
fraud based on the Melrod Firm's alleged intentional sabotage of the
loan transaction coupled with Dominion's secret intent not to proceed
with the deal beyond the preclosing meeting originally scheduled for
February 2, 1984. 44 The district court placed great weight on its finding
that Community Savings & Loan ("Community"), Dominion's sub-participant who purchased $17.5 million of Dominion's interest in the loan
syndicate, had backed out by February 29, 1984, thereby forcing Dominion to breach its commitment to the loan because it had exceeded its
legal lending limit. Thus, since the district court was relying on facts
which occurred in late February, there was no support for its conclusion
that the Melrod Firm committed fraud upon Borrower at the preclosing
meeting on February 9, 1984. Additionally, the Second Circuit's finding
that Community did not withdraw until March 20, 1984, and that the
loan commitment had expired on March 1, 1984, removed the motive
behind any alleged fraud. In sum, the Second Circuit reversed the fraud
claim due to insufficient evidence to support the claim.
4.

45
Lessons Derived from Penthouse

a. Emphasis on the Written Document
The most important lesson from Penthouse is that in complex com42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 987.
Id. at 981.
Id.at 986-87.
See generally Calbreath, Long Year Ends For Dominion, Wash. Bus. Journ., Sept. 5,

1988; Chaitman, On Lender-Liability Claims, Appeals Court Applies the Brakes, Legal Times, Oct.
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mercial transactions between sophisticated parties with access to counsel
"the parties will not be presumed to intend to vary material terms of the
deal that had previously been committed with care and specificity to
writing by off-the-cuff or informal dealings thereafter."' 46 The Second
Circuit's message appears to be that complicated lending transactions
should be governed by well-established principles of contract law in order to inspire confidence that the loan documents will set out the rights
and obligations of the various parties to the transactions and that oral
conversations or waivers are an inappropriate means of varying the
terms of the loan agreement. "The court just reaffirmed that when you
have sophisticated contracting parties, represented by able counsel in a
very complex commercial transaction, they are going to have to live by
47
the words of the documents they draft."1
b.

Lead Lender Without Authority to Waive Preclosing Conditions

Commercial reality in the lending arena dictates that lead lenders
include loan participants in the decision-making process with respect to
extensions of credit and other lending issues. Penthouse judicially reinforces this commercial reality by standing for the proposition that, absent consent by all the loan participants, a lead lender may not waive any
terms that materially affect the substance of the transaction. While this
sweeping proposition deserves support, there are some fundamental
flaws which may hamper enforcement of this rule.
First, with respect to those conditions which do not substantially
affect the terms of a transaction, a lead lender may feel compelled by the
Penthouse decision to require, in the absence of express authorization,
strict compliance with all conditions of the commitment regardless of
how burdensome this may be to all parties involved. 48 Furthermore, the
Penthouse decision does not define any standards or guidelines as to how
a lender determines which terms of a loan commitment are "material"
or "substantial". 4 9 Moreover, the Penthouse decision leaves the borrower
in the unwieldy position of determining whether the lead bank has obtained the consent of participants to waiver of preclosing conditions.
"[B]orrowers are now on notice that the lead has no apparent authority to
waive conditions to closing; hence, even if the lead misrepresents its authority to the borrower, the participants will not be bound by its waivers." 50 This issue dovetails into the problem of who bears the risk of
unauthorized acts of the lead lender - the borrower or the participating
Penthouse Case, A4ttorneys Say, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 506 (Sept. 19, 1988); The
Penthouse Reversal, 2 Lender Liability Law Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont), No. 5, at I

(Nov. 1988).
46. The Penthouse Reversal, 2 Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont),
No. 5, at 3 (Nov. 1988).
47. Focus On Enforcement Of Written Agreements Is Message To Be Derived From Penthouse
Case, Attorneys Say, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 506. (Sept. 19, 1988).

48.
No. 5.
49.
50.

The Penthouse Reversal, 2 Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont),
at 4 (Nov. 1988).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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lenders? 5 1 Furthermore, if the loan participants agree to grant full
waiver power to the lead lender, does this comport with sensible underwriting practice? These questions must be addressed in the aftermath of
Penthouse.
c.

Other Implication

If the district court decision had been sustained on appeal, Dominion would have been forced to liquidate. "In today's economy, with the
federal savings-and-loan bail-out estimated at tens of billions of dollars,
no court is going to want to create another failed institution.' '52 The
Penthouse decision suggests that before the Second Circuit will remove
the last lifeboat from a sinking financial institution, the court will carefully scrutinize the law as applied to the facts in each case.
B.

Kruse v. Bank of America

In Kruse v. Bank of America 53 ("Kruse") the California Court of Appeals held that Bank of America ("Bank") was not liable for fraud, bad
faith denial of contract, interference with prospective economic advantage or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Consequently, the
court vacated a $47 million judgment which had been awarded to two
families of apple growers and processors.
1. Facts
GeorgeJewell ("Jewell"), an apple farmer, and the O'Connell Company ("O'Connell"), an apple processing company, had been longstanding customers of Bank. When Bank abruptly terminated O'Connell's
customary annual line of credit in 1975, Jewell agreed to render financial assistance in order to aid his fellow farmer and keep a viable market
open for his apples. Jewell negotiated with William Sullivan ("Sullivan"), branch manager of Bank, to borrow money from Bank which
would be used to provide loans to O'Connell. In 1976 and 1977, Jewell
borrowed in excess of $400,000 from Bank, which he in turn lent to
O'Connell to finance equipment purchases and repayment of loans to
Bank. During these years Jewell provided other assistance to O'Connell
in the form of increased financial advice, negotiating with O'Connell's
creditors to extend payment terms and supplying O'Connell with large
54
quantities of apples on credit alone.
In late 1977, O'Connell decided to build a new apple dehydration
facility ("facility"). Since Bank was unwilling to provide further loans to
O'Connell, Jewell again "undertook responsibility to obtain the neces51. Focus on Enforcement of Written Agreement is Message to be derived from Penthouse Case,
Attorneys Say, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 11, at 506 (Sept. 19, 1988).
52. Chaitman, On Lender-Liabilitv Claims, Appeals Court Applies the Brakes, Legal Times,

Oct. 17, 1988, at 18.
53. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989).
54. Kruse, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
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sary financing."' 5 5 While initially believing that Bank would provide the
long-term financing, Jewell was forced to find an alternate source of
funds when Bank refused to lend the money while Dan O'Connell remained as manager of the facility. 56 Jewell was successful in obtaining a
$650,000 loan from North Coast Production Credit Association
("PCA") evidenced by a seven-year promissory note. Jewell later borrowed another $500,000 from PCA to buy a new dehydrator. Construc57
tion of the facility began in May, 1978.

After obtaining the PCA loan, Sullivan and Jewell reopened negotiations with Bank regarding the long-term financing necessary for the
facility. During these discussions, "Jewell knew that Sullivan did not
have authority to approve large loans." 5 8 After receiving another
$209,000 loan from Bank to purchase equipment for the facility, Sullivan strongly urged Jewell to obtain a controlling interest in O'Connell
as it was becoming more difficult for Bank to continue investing in the
facility without Jewell possessing a controlling interest. Believing that
Bank would not provide the long-term financing without an equity ownership position in O'Connell, Jewell met with Irene Kruse ("Kruse"), the
sole owner of O'Connell, who "reluctantly agreed to transfer a majority
of her stock to [Jewell's son] for $180 with the expectation that the stock
would be returned once the Bank funded the long-term loan enabling
' 59
O'Connell to repay [Jewell].
Cost overruns for construction of the facility forced Jewell to borrow more money from Bank creating a total indebtedness of over $1
million to Bank. However, Jewell was still optimistic that he would be
able to secure long-term financing which would permit consolidation of
the several debts under a favorable repayment schedule. Still, Jewell
knew that Sullivan did not have authority to commit Bank to such longterm financing. Aware of Sullivan's limited authority, Jewell took great
comfort when one of Sullivan's superiors visited the Facility and exclaimed, "[W]e're going to be able to help you."' 60 Jewell took this
statement to mean that the long-term loan would be approved. However, in August 1979, when Bank's appraisal of the Facility reflected a
value inadequate to warrant a $1.9 million loan, Bank declined to pro61
vide the long-term financing.
In 1980, an economic downturn in the apple industry caused
O'Connell to sustain heavy losses, leaving it unable to repay the construction loans advanced byJewell. Similarly, O'Connell was unable to
repay Jewell for the tons of apples which Jewell had supplied on credit.
O'Connell was indebted tojewell for over $2.7 million. Jewell, in turn,
was heavily indebted to his growers, PCA, and Bank. Recognizing Jew55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
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Id.
Id. at
Id.at
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Id. at
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eli's economic plight, Bank informed him that it would not lend him any
more funds. After an emotional breakdbwn, Jewell was assured by Bank
that, if he would provide deeds of trust on his real property to secure the
outstanding loans as well as agree to apply any proceeds derived from
the sale of such property to repay the loans, Bank would advance sufficient funds to pay off the growers and protect him from the demands of
the PCA. Bank also insisted that Jewell liquidate O'Connell properties
to provide additional funds to pay off the outstanding indebtedness. In
May, 1981, Jewell filed a petition in bankruptcy. O'Connell filed for
62
bankruptcy one year later.
Both Jewell and Kruse filed lender liability claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Jewell in the amount of $17.25 million in
compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages. 63 The
jury also returned a verdict in favor of Kruse in the amount of $2.77
million in compensatory damages and $6.68 million in punitive
damages .64
2.

Reversing theJewell Fraud Claims

Jewell claimed that Bank was liable for actual and constructive fraud
by failing to disclose facts concerning O'Connell while at the same time
encouraging Jewell to obtain loans to rescue O'Connell from dire financial straits. Thus, Jewell argued that the 1976-1977 loans which he obtained to rejuvenate O'Connell's general financial condition were of
paramount significance in his later financial ruin. 65 Jewell posited that,
but for his reliance on Bank in encouraging him to rescue O'Connell, he
would have escaped economic devastation. However, in overturning the
trial court, the California Court of Appeals disagreed and opined that
"[t]he record convincingly and conclusively demonstrates that the 19761977 loans made to finance [O'Connell] were not a substantial factor in
[Jewell's] financial collapse.''66 In reaching this conclusion, the court
looked to the following intervening factors as the reasons Jewell ultimately experienced financial difficulties: 1) the heavy indebtedness incurred in 1978-1979 in order to assist O'Connell in construction of the
facility; 2) O'Connell's failure to repay construction funds borrowed
from Jewell; 3) the economic downturn of the 1979-1980 apple season;
4) O'Connell's failure to repay nearly $2 million owed to Jewell for apples delivered on credit; and 5) the bankruptcy of one of Jewell's major
67
customers.
Jewell also claimed that Bank fraudulently induced him to incur
heavy indebtedness for short-term borrowing without disclosing the
possibility that his request for long-term financing for the facility would
be denied. The court reasoned that there was no basis for justifiable
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at224.
Id. at 224-25.
Id.at 231.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id.
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reliance by Jewell concerning Bank's failure to disclose that the longterm loan might be denied and further noted that Jewell was aware of
Sullivan's limited lending authority. "If the conduct of [Jewell] in the
light of his own intelligence and information was manifestly unreasonable, ... he will be denied recovery." ' 6 8 With respect to comments made
by Sullivan's supervisor, the court determined thatJewell's "hopeful expectations cannot be equated with the necessary justifiable reliance" to
69
establish a claim of fraud.
Jewell also claimed to have been fraudulently induced into shortterm borrowing based on Bank's promise to commit to a long-term loan
secured by Jewell's ranch. This claim was premised upon discussions
between Sullivan and Jewell in which Sullivan suggested that Jewell use
his ranch as security for the loan. The court found it significant that on
more than one occasion Jewell refused to use his ranch as security for
the loan. Furthermore, it wasn't until after Bank had terminated any
further unsecured loans that Jewell sought to use his ranch as collateral
for a loan. At this point, however, Jewell's economic picture was so
bleak that not even presenting the ranch as collateral would warrant an
additional loan. Dismissing any justifiable reliance, the court found that
Jewell "could not reasonably have expected that the Bank's promise or
assurances of a loan secured by the Jewell Ranch would70extend indefinitely, notwithstanding such a staggering debt picture."
Jewell also claimed that Bank was liable for the tort of bad faith
denial of contract. 7 1 In rejecting this claim, the court of appeals decided
not to "navigate [the] murky waters" of whether there was a breach of
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 228.
71. In support of this argumentJewell cited Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard
Oil, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). Seaman's is often cited in
the lender liability context because it is the leading case extending the reach of the tort of
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Seaman's court redefined the
contours of the tort by holding that "a tort action is available for breach of the covenant
[of good faith and fair dealing] in an insurance contract..." and "emphasized the 'special
relationship' between insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public interest,
adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility." Seaman's 686 P.2d at 1166 (citation omitted). The
court went on to hold that in an ordinary commercial contract where a special relationship
between the parties does not exist, a party to a contract may incur tort liability only when,
"in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in
bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists." Id. at 1167.
The Seaman's rationale was applied by analogy in Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
California Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985). Based upon its conclusion that "banking and insurance have much in common, both being highly regulated
industries performing vital public services substantially affecting the public welfare," the
Commercial Colton court held that "[tihe relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasifiduciary." Commercial Cotton, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
Relying upon the Commercial Collon rationale, the court in Barrett v. Bank of America,
183 Cai. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986), held that "a relationship of trust and
confidence exists between a bank and its loan customers ... [which] gives rise to a duty of
disclosure of facts which may place the bank or a third party at an advantage with respect
to its customer." Barrett, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (citation omitted).
See generally Comments, Seaman 's Direct BuYing Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in a NAoninsurance Commercial Contract Case,
71 IOWA L. R\,. 893 (1986).
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the duty to disclose based on a confidential relationship between Bank
and Jewell. 72 Instead, the court preferred a traditional contract law ap-

proach by reasoning that "[t]he inherent precondition to such a tort
claim is the existence and breach of an enforceable contract." 73 The court
had little difficulty finding that there was no contract, oral or written,
between Jewell and Bank providing for long-term financing. The court
found Jewell merely had a hopeful expectation that a loan agreement
would be reached with Bank in the future. Relying on well-established
contract doctrine the court held that when the subject matter that is
under consideration is left open for further negotiation and agreement,
"there is no contract, not for vagueness or indefiniteness of terms but
74
for lack of any terms."
3.

Reversing the Kruse Claims of Fraud, Interference with
Economic Advantage, and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress

Kruse asserted that Bank fraudulently induced her to transfer her
controlling stock interest in O'Connell to Jewell's son by misrepresenting that long-term financing would then be made available. The court
held that recovery for fraud was not available unless Kruse "changed her
position in justified reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation resulting in damage." 7 5 The court found no evidence that Bank promised to
make long-term financing available for the facility. The court's conclusion was reinforced by the fact that Kruse conceded there was no contract to lend money since no terms had been negotiated. Kruse claimed
damages for diminution in value of the stock and sought the difference
between the fair market value of her stock, $490,393 and the amount she
received for it, $180. However, the court concluded that Bank played
no part in setting the price for the stock purchase and thus could not be
liable for any resulting loss of value. Hence, Kruse's fraud claim against
Bank could not be sustained because there was no evidence supporting
either an implied promise to lend or the essential element of justifiable
reliance.76

Kruse premised her claim against Bank for interference with economic advantage upon the theory that Bank's refusal to provide longterm financing and its efforts to liquidate O'Connell were deliberately
motivated to disrupt her business relationship with O'Connell. The
court disposed of this argument with a two-pronged attack. First, the
court determined that intentional interference with economic advantage
applies only when there is "wrongful interference with an economic relationship by a third party."'7 7 In this case there were only two parties
72.
(1988),
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 53, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 225
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989).
Kruse 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
Id. at 229 (citation omitted).
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involved - Bank and O'Connell. Second, in analyzing whether interference by Bank was tantamount to a breach of contract, the court relied on
the established principle that "interference with business relations is or78
dinarily privileged if one has a financial interest in one of the parties."
Thus, Bank was not liable in tort for interference with an economic advantage merely by protecting its vested economic interest.
In rejecting Kruse's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, the court reaffirmed Bank's right to protect its economic interest.
The court found that Bank's liquidation of the O'Connell properties was
a reasonable step in asserting its legal right to repayment for the debt
owed byJewell. It held that a party is not subject to liability for infliction
of emotional distress when it has merely pursued its own economic interests and properly asserted its legal rights. The court qualified its remarks by asserting that Bank could not protect its economic self-interest
in an impermissible or illegal manner. However, in this case there was
no such evidence because Bank never had any direct contact with
79
Kruse.
4.

Lessons Derived from Kruse

Perhaps the most important message to be derived from Kruse can
be found in what the court did not hold. The facts in Kruse presented a
prime opportunity for the court to expand the application of tort and
fiduciary principles to banks and other lending institutions. 80 With respect to the extension of fiduciary duties to banks, the Kruse court recognized that the plaintiffs' claims arose in the context of the commercial
lending arena and, rather than applying fiduciary law, the court preferred to premise its legal analysis upon fundamental contract doctrine.
With respect to the tortious breach claims, it has been stated that the
Kruse court "emasculated the tort of breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, within the context of lender-borrower
relationships." 8 1

Other important teachings from Kruse include the following: 1)
words of encouragement do not commit a bank to provide long-term
financing; 2) if a borrower knows that a loan officer has limited lending
authority he cannot be said to have justifiably relied on any promises
made by the officer which exceed his authority; and 3) a bank is not
liable for a borrower's emotional distress merely because the bank lawfully protected its economic self-interest. 8 2 Moreover, the Kruse opinion
suggests that appellate review will emphasize the need for certainty and
definiteness in a loan commitment and that the written loan agreement
will be the barometer of the lender's conduct.
78.

Id. (citations omitted).

79. Id. at 234-35.
80. See supra note 71.
81. 51 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 14, at 621 (Oct. 10, 1988).
82. Atlorney For Bank of America Praises Reversal of Big Lender Liability Verdict, 50 Banking
Rep. (BNA), No. 22, at 912, (May 30, 1988).
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Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank

In Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank 83 ("Gillman"), the assignee for
creditors of Jamaica Tobacco and Sales Corporation ("Jamaica")
brought a lawsuit against Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase") which had
segregated Jamaica's checking account thereby putting the funds beyond Jamaica's reach. The New York Court of Appeals held that
Chase's security agreement with Jamaica was neither procedurally nor
substantively unconscionable. Moreover, the court determined that
Chase proceeded in good faith and acted in a commercially reasonable
manner in setting off Jamaica's deposit account without notice.
1. Facts
Jamaica applied to Chase for a $400,000 irrevocable letter of credit
to be issued for the benefit of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
("Aetna"). On the face of the application was a bold-faced declaration
stating: "The Security Agreement on the reverse hereof is hereby accepted and made applicable to this Application and the Credit."' 84 The

security agreement gave Chase the right to set-off against any Jamaica
accounts at Chase when in good faith Chase deemed itself insecure.
85
Chase's right to set-off could be executed without notice or demand.
Chase was authorized to deposit funds obtained from any set-off of Jamaica's account into a separate account to which Jamaica would not have
access. As additional security for the letter of credit, Jamaica provided
Chase with a "negative pledge" agreement stating that it would not
knowingly allow any other creditors to perfect security interests against
the assets of the company under the Uniform Commercial Code until
repayment ofJamaica's indebtedness to Chase. Jamaica also provided a
"loan restriction" agreement confirming that Jamaica would not incur
any loan debts while indebted to Chase as well as a "subordination"
agreement executed by Jamaica's president stipulating that Jamaica's
debt to him would be subordinate to its obligation to Chase. Finally,
Jamaica provided personal guarantees executed by Jamaica's principal
officers and their spouses for any indebtedness owed by Jamaica to
Chase.8 6 In August, 1981, Chase issued the irrevocable letter of credit
in favor of Aetna.
In August, 1982, Chase learned that Jamaica was experiencing serious financial difficulties. In October, 1982, Chase discovered that Jamaica had violated the terms of the negative pledge agreement, the loan
restriction agreement, and the subordination agreement. Chase subsequently deemed itself insecure and, without notice to Jamaica, transferred $372,920 from Jamaica's checking account to an account over
which Jamaica had no control. As a consequence, checks drawn on the
Jamaica account were dishonored. Jamaica executed a deed of assign83.
84.
85.
86.

73 N.Y.2d 1, 534 N.E.2d 824, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1988).
Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 827.
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ment for the benefit of creditors and the assignee brought suit against
Chase.
In awarding compensatory, consequential and punitive damages,
the trial court held that the security agreement was unconscionable and
transthat Chase acted in bad faith by failing to notify Jamaica about the
87
fer of funds which prevented Jamaica from paying its creditors.
2.

Reversing the Unconscionability Claim

The New York Court of Appeals determined that the record was
devoid of any evidence to sustain a claim against Chase based on unconscionability. In disposing of the procedural element of unconscionability, the court examined the "contract formation process and the alleged
lack of meaningful choice." 8 8 The assignee's claim of procedural unconscionability was based solely on the testimony of Jamaica's president
who was unaware of the security agreement when he signed the letter of
credit application. The court was unimpressed with this argument as
evidenced by its conclusion that "[t]he contract concerned a type of
commercial transaction routinely entered into in the course of [Jamaica's] business and one with which UJamaica's president] was necessarily familiar from his several years of running the business." 89 Thus,
the court looked to the relative bargaining power and presumed sophistication in business matters of the parties to the transaction and found
that there was no evidence to support a determination of procedural
90
unconscionability.
The court was equally unimpressed by the assignee's claim based on
substantive unconscionability. In evaluating whether the terms of the
security agreement were unreasonably favorable to Chase, the court
again looked to the commercial context of the transaction. It concluded
that by any reasonable standard the terms of the security agreement
were not so overbalanced in favor of Chase as to be found substantively
unconscionable. 9 1 In construing the commercial reasonableness of the
terms in the security agreement authorizing Chase to segregate Jamaica's funds without notice, the court took notice of Chase's unconditional obligation to disburse funds under the letter of credit. The
purpose of the security agreement was to provide Chase "with the
means of protecting itself from potential loss due to the financial inability of [Jamaica] to make the promised reimbursement for any payment
Chase is required to make to [Aetna]." 9 2 The court held that Chase's
segregation of Jamaica's funds without notice was a contractual right
which served as a protective measure in Chase's favor. The court reasoned that if advance notice had been required, Jamaica could have "defeated the purpose of the security interest by the simple expedient of
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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withdrawing its funds." '93 The court concluded by stating that since the
policy of the Uniform Commercial Code's unconscionability provision9 4
is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise and not to readjust the
agreed allocation of the risks in light of some perceived imbalance in the
parties' bargaining power, it would not disturb the allocation of risks to
95
which the parties agreed.
3.

Reversing the Commercial Bad Faith Claim

The assignee claimed that Chase acted in commercial bad faith by
segregating Jamaica's funds without notice and dishonoring Jamaica's
checks after the segregation had occurred. Furthermore, the assignee
claimed that Chase was liable for commercial bad faith because Chase
segregated Jamaica's funds before there was ever any request for disbursement by Aetna.
With respect to the bad faith claim premised on failure to notify
Jamaica of the impending segregation, the court found there was no evidence of commercial bad faith because complying with a notice requirement could have resulted in the depletion of the account and the
destruction of the security interest. 96 The court's reasoning continued
that, since there was no bad faith with respect to notice, there could be
no basis for a finding of bad faith when checks drawn on the segregated
account were subsequently returned unpaid. 9 7 Finally, the court determined that, although Aetna had not yet requested a disbursement, it was
likely that such a reimbursement request would be forthcoming given
Jamaica's insolvency. Therefore, in segregating Jamaica's account in anticipation of disbursement to Aetna pursuant to its obligation under the
letter of credit, Chase would not be held to have acted in bad faith when
it took steps to safeguard the fund in which it had an existing security
interest and which was the only available asset for its reimbursement
from Jamaica. 9 8
4.

Lessons Derived from Gillman

The Gillman opinion "followed a well-established rule of law in New
York: that courts only overturn contracts for unconscionability for parties who could not be expected to understand the contract terms." 9 9
The court reaffirmed that sophisticated parties to a commercial transaction will not be able to avoid the transaction by claiming they did not
understand the ramifications of their actions. The court's emphasis on
the transaction's commercial setting intimates that when business dealings run aground there are higher thresholds of wrongdoing which must
93. Id.
94. U.C.C. § 2-302, IA U.L.A. 16 (1989).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 831.
98. Id. at 832.
99. New York Court ofAppeals Upholds Chase Manhattan Letter of Credit Security Agreement, 52
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 3, at 130 (Jan. 16, 1989).
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be proved before liability will attach from one commercial entity to
another.
Gillman also parallels the messages derived from Penthouse and
Kruse. As in Penthouse, the Gillman court stresses the primacy of the written document when commercial entities become engaged in a legal dispute. However, while Penthouse was instructive in issuing a caveat about
deviating from the written terms of a loan commitment, Gillman teaches
that the courts expect sophisticated parties to read and understand the
written documents that will govern the transaction. Like Kruse, the Gillman court declined to expand the application of the implied obligation
of good faith and fair dealing in the commercial lending arena beyond
its previously defined parameters. By distinguishing an important
lender liability case based on the good faith obligation, 10 0 the court intimated that the implied obligation of good faith is not relevant with respect to a "bank's actions . . .[involving] a security interest specifically

granted in a bank deposit."''
III.

STATE STATUTORY REFORM IN RESPONSE TO THE DELUGE OF

LENDER LIABILITY LITIGATION

The increased torrent of lender liability litigation resulting in enormous verdicts has prompted some state legislatures to consider measures limiting litigation against the financial community. While some
states have formally enacted legislation to stem the rising tide of lender
liability, others are in the process of drafting and debating similar measures to decelerate the lender liability cascade.
A.

California

One of the lender liability concepts currently in vogue is that of
holding banks liable for oral promises or oral commitments to lend
based on estoppel and breach of contract theories. Before its reversal,
Kruse was the leading case standing for the proposition that an oral commitment to lend money may be considered binding. To alleviate litigation arising from oral commitments to lend, the California Legislature
has joined the ranks of many states in amending its Statute of Frauds.
As ofJanuary 1, 1990, California borrowers are barred from suing on an
oral commitment to make a commercial loan in an amount exceeding
$100,000. As amended, California's Statute of Frauds reads as follows:
The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some
note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged or by the party's agent:
(g) A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to
loan money or to grant or extend credit, in an amount greater
than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), not primarily
100. K.M.C. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
101. Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 831.
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for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person
engaged in the business of lending or arranging for the lending
of money or extending credit. For purposes of this section, a
contract, promise, undertaking or commitment to loan money
secured solely by residential property consisting of one to four
dwelling units shall be02 deemed to be for personal, family, or
household purposes. 1
This amendment is expected to significantly reduce lender liability
litigation in California since "more than half the disputes between com' 10 3
mercial lenders and borrowers arise from such oral commitments.
California's message is clear that in the commercial context, the writing
as embodied in the loan commitment will prevail over informal
04
dealings. 1
The status of other legislative reform addressing lender liability is
uncertain at this time. While the following discussion clearly is not law
in California, it provides a useful insight into some of the issues on the
0 5
lender liability front that may soon be addressed by statutory reform.1
On the environmental front, Senate Bill Number 842 of the 198788 regular session (a bill which passed the California Senate but died
before enactment) would have allowed lenders to seek personal judgments against borrowers rather than foreclose on them where the value
of the property owned by the borrower was diminished or rendered val102. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1624(g) (West Supp. 1989).
103. California Legislature Approves Limits on Liability For Oral Promises, 51 Banking Rep.
(BNA), No. 10, at 435 (Sept. 12, 1988).
104. Texas, Delaware and Oklahoma are also debating measures to limit lawsuits by
borrowers based on oral statements made by the lender. The Texas bill would not allow
for lawsuits based on oral representations involving transactions greater than $50,000;
however, the bill's liability restrictions were recently dealt a setback from the lender's perspective due to the Senate Economic Development Committee's decision to add an
amendment which would bring lenders under the coverage of Texas' Deceptive Trade
Practices Act ("DTPA"). The DTPA allows for lawsuits for oral representations on a limited basis.
See generally Texas Banks Hit By Bill Amendment, 13 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor,
Inc.) No. 10, at 5 (Mar. 13, 1989); Texas Readies Bill To Limit Lawsuits, Nip Bad Banking Early,
12 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.) No. 46, at 1 (Nov. 21, 1988); Texas to Hear
Liability Testimony, 13 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.) No. 8,at 10 (Feb. 27, 1989);
Texas TrialLawyers To Battle Bank Bill, 12 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.) No. 47, at
5 (Nov. 28, 1988).
Delaware's bill, in preventing the use of a lender's oral representations as the basis of
a lawsuit, would disallow any oral testimony to be introduced in a suit involving transactions greater than $25. See Texas to Hear Liability Testimony, 13 Bank Letter (Institutional
Investor, Inc.) No. 8, at 10 (Feb. 27, 1989).
Oklahoma's measure stipulates that "no lender or borrower may maintain an action
on a credit agreement in an amount greater than $5,000, unless the agreement is in writing, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the party against whom
the agreement is sought to be enforced." Oklahoma House Approves Bill Limiting Lenders'
Liability, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 5, at 229 (Jan. 30, 1989).
105. See generally California Legislature Approves Limits on Liability For Oral Promises, 51
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 10, at 435 (Sept. 12, 1988); Environmental Liability, Statute of
Frauds Bills Considered By CaliforniaAssembly, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 122 (July 25,
1988); Limits on Lender Liability, Broadened Bank Insurance Authority Top California Agenda, 50
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 306 (Feb. 22, 1988).
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ueless by hazardous substance contamination.' 0 6 The bill was designed
to avoid California's "one-action" rule requiring that "if a loan is secured by realty, a lender may only enforce the loan by proceeding
against the real property, as in a foreclosure action." 10 7 A proposed
amendment would have helped keep lenders responsible for their actions by providing that the exception to the one-action rule "would not
apply when a lender substantially caused or contributed to the release or
threatened release of the hazardous substance."' 1 8 At this time, no further inroads have been made in the environmental arena of California's
lender liability reform.
An agricultural lender liability bill, Assembly Bill Number 1717, introduced in 1987, also did not survive California's 1987-88 session. 10 9
The bill would have required mandatory mediation of farm lending disputes. Inserting mandatory arbitration provisions in loan agreements
has been one measure that banks have used to thwart lender liability
suits in the drafting stage. A legislative blessing would merely codify
this evolving practice between commercial lenders and borrowers; however, this bill has yet to resurface.I 10
One final measure which has been hotly contested is whether the
California legislature will limit punitive damage awards against lenders.
The California Bankers Association has been lobbying for a proposal to
limit punitive damage awards to the lesser of $1 million or one percent
of the lender's net worth, or cap the award at two times the amount of
any compensatory damages awarded.'' I This proposal has been successfully opposed as of this date by the California Trial Lawyers Association. 1 2 Other states are also wrestling with whether to3 limit punitive
damage awards against banks and lending institutions."
B.

Colorado' 14
Colorado has joined other states in requiring credit agreements to

106. California Legislature Approves Limits on Liability for Oral Promises, 51 Banking Rep.
(BNA), No. 10, at 435 (Sept. 12, 1988).
107. Environmental Liability, Statute of Frauds Bills Considered By California Assembly, 51
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 4, at 122 (July 25, 1988).

108. Id.
109.

Limits on Lender Liability, Broadened Bank InsuranceAuthority Top California Agenda, 50

Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 306, (Feb. 22, 1988).
110. See generally Pitts, Arbitrating Lender Liability Claims, 105 BANKING L.J. 227 (1988);
California Banks Using Arbitration to Cut Court Costs, Avoid Jury Verdicts, 50 Banking Report
(BNA), No. 13, at 544 (Mar. 28, 1988); IA Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Com-

mercial Code (MB), § 11.04 (1988 and Supp. 1989).'
1I1. Limits on Lender Liability, Broadened Bank InsuranceAuthority Top California Agenda, 50

Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 306 (Feb. 22, 1988).
112.

But see Will California Supreme Court Bar Punitive Damages in Lender Liability Suits?, 2

Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont), No. 9, at 2 (Mar. 1989).
113. The Texas Trial Lawyers Association has vigorously opposed a lender liability
draft bill which would "place a cap on punitive damages of either two to three times the
." Texas Trial Lawyers to
actual loss or an amount equal to a bank's entire lending limit ....
12 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.), No. 47, at 5 (Nov. 28, 1988).
Battle Bank Bill,
114. See generally Shafer, Limiting Lender Liability Through the Statute of Frauds, 18 COLO.
LAw. No. 9, 1725 (1989). Shafer's article provides an in-depth analysis of Colorado's
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be in writing. I 15 On July 1, 1989, the following provisions took effect:
[N]o debtor or creditor may file or maintain an action or a
claim relating to a credit agreement involving a principal
amount in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars unless the
credit agreement is in writing and is signed by the person
against whom enforcement is sought.
A credit agreement may not be implied under any circumstances, including, without limitation, from the relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor or from
performance or partial performance by or on behalf of the
creditor or debtor, or promissory estoppel.' 16
It should be noted that the legislation applies only to credit agreements
with "financial institutions" which are defined as "a bank, savings and
loan association, savings bank, industrial bank, credit union, mortgage
or finance company."' 17 Thus, the "Colorado law does not protect
non-institutional lenders, regardless of the regularity with which they
engage in loan transactions."' 18
Colorado's legislation is unusual in several respects. First, Colorado has not been inundated with the lender liability lawsuits that have
led other states to enact similar measures. Colorado's legislation should
thus be recognized as a preemptive measure to fend off any would-be
law suits based on undocumented oral promises. 1 9 In addition, the
statutory language suggests that while Colorado might recognize a fiduciary relationship between a creditor and a debtor in certain situations,
the relationship will never give rise to an implied credit agreement. Finally, the Colorado legislation differs from other states because the bill
eliminates exceptions to the Statute of Frauds based on partial perform120
ance or promissory estoppel.
lender liability reform as compared with other states which have taken similar measures.
As the author points out, Colorado's legislation differs from the other states in the
following areas: (1) the Colorado statute protects a significantly narrower class of creditors
than in California, Georgia, Minnesota, Texas and Oklahoma; (2) Colorado's definition of
"credit agreement" is vastly different from the other state statutes in that it covers any
financial accomodation whatsoever, and unlike any of the other states, the Colorado law
covers agreements to borrow or repay in addition to agreements to extend credit; (3)
unlike Oklahoma, Texas, and California, the Colorado statute does not provide for
exclusions from the definition of credit agreement; (4) the minimum dollar amount in
Colorado for which a claim is subject to the new legislation is $25,000; whereas, in
Oklahoma it is $15,000; in Texas it is $50,000; and in California it is $100,000; and (5)
Colorado law also differs from other states in that it eliminates traditional exceptions to
the Statute of Frauds.
115. See generally Colo Lender Liability Close to Signing, 13 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.), No. 9, at 6 (Mar. 6, 1989); Colorado Adopts Bill to Limit Liability on Credit Agreements,
Rejects Branching, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 9, at 481 (Feb. 27, 1989).
116. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
117. Id.
118. Shafer, supra note 114, at 1296.
119. Colo Lender Liability Close to Signing, 13 Bank Letter (Institutional Investor, Inc.),
No. 9, at 6 (Mar. 6, 1989).
120. Colorado Adopts Bill to Limit Liability on Credit Agreements, Rejects Branching, 52 Banking
Rep. (BNA), No. 9, at 481 (Feb. 27, 1989).
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Kansas

Kansas has also conformed its law respecting credit agreements to
bar bank customer lawsuits "for failing to carry out a particular promise
relating to extension of creditor a financial accommodation unless that
promise [is] specifically in writing and signed by both parties."' 12' Kansas defines a credit agreement as "[an agreement by a financial institution to lend or delay repayment of money ... or... to otherwise extend
credit or to make any other financial accomodation.' l2 2 On January 1,
1989, the requirements for an enforceable credit agreement became:
(a) A debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action on a
credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing and is
signed by the creditor and the debtor.
(b) All credit agreements shall contain a clear, conspicuous and printed notice to the debtor that states that the written
agreement is a final expression of the agreement between the
creditor and debtor and such written agreement may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior oral agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement between the creditor and
debtor. A written credit agreement shall contain a sufficient
space for the placement of nonstandard terms, including the
reduction to writing of a previous oral agreement and an affirmation, signed or initialed by the debtor and the creditor,2 3that
no unwritten oral agreement between the parties exists.'
Initially there were two criticisms of the Kansas statutory scheme.
First, the imprecise definition of credit agreement led to the uncertainty
of whether security agreements, mortgages and promissory notes were
included within the definition. Second, there was confusion over
whether a credit agreement would be unenforceable if the notice provision in section 2(b) of the act were not included in the agreement. To
resolve these ambiguities, the Kansas Attorney General issued a general
124
opinion at the behest of the Kansas Bankers Association.
The Attorney General's opinion addressed the concerns of the Kansas Bankers Association in two-step fashion. First, the opinion concluded that security agreements, mortgages, and promissory notes were
not credit agreements within the meaning of the act; however, the document creating the interest may become a credit agreement if its terms
include a promise to lend or delay repayment of money or make any
other financial accomodation. Second, if the required notice in section
2(b) is absent, the opinion concluded that the credit agreement is still
enforceable as written, but it may be varied if there is evidence of mis25
representation upon which a party to the credit agreement relied.'
121. Kansas Law to Limit Liability By Barring Lawsuits Based on Oral Promises to Lend, 5 i
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 918 (Nov. 28, 1988). See also Kansas Banks Get Securities

Powers, American Banker, Apr. 15, 1988, at 1.
122.
123.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-117 (1988).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-118 (1988).
Op. Kan. Att'y Gen. No. 89-19 (Feb. 21, 1989).

124.
125. Id.
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It must be remembered that the Attorney General's opinion is not
the law. Until the statute is judicially construed, the prudent lender
should reference all written agreements that are part of the transaction
in the notice provision of the credit agreement to avoid a later dispute
12 6
over whether these other written documents are part of the deal.
D.

Louisiana

The Louisiana legislature has responded to the lender liability challenge by amending its version of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") to limit the lender's "potential for liability for breach of the
covenant of good-faith and fair dealing."' 127 Louisiana's version of
U.C.C. § 1-203 (the good faith obligation in performing or enforcing a
contract), as amended, 128 now directs that the standard of good-faith
performance is based on Article 1997 of the Civil Code which provides
that "[a]n obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable
or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform."' 12 9 The
official comments to Article 1997 relate that "[a]n obligor is in bad faith
30
if he intentionally and maliciously fails to perform his obligation."'1
Thus, by heightening the standard upon which a lender may be sued for
breach of the good-faith duty, the Louisiana "amendment is intended to
limit good-faith and fair-dealing litigation in Louisiana to situations in
13 1
which a party has acted intentionally and maliciously."'
E.

Other States

In addition to the state statutory reform discussed above, the following states have also amended their Statutes of Frauds to require certain credit agreements to be in writing in order to be enforceable:
35
34
Georgia, 132 Texas,1 33 Oklahoma,1 and Minnesota.1
IV.

CONCLUSION

After much publicized success for borrowers, the tide of lender liability seems to be shifting in favor of lenders. Recent judicial decisions
at both the state and federal appellate level are "giving hope to lenders
that their salvation lies on appeal from emotional juries and trial
126. Kansas Law to Limit Liability By Barring Lawsuits Based on Oral Promises to Lend, 51
Banking Rep. (BNA), No. 21, at 918 (Nov. 28, 1988).
127. See Louisiana Amends UCC to Limit Good-Faith Litigation, 2 Lender Liability L. Rep.
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont), No. 4, at 3 (Oct. 1988).
128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-203 (West Supp. 1989).
129. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1997 (West 1987).

130. Id. at comment (b).
13 1. Louisiana Amends UCC to Limit Good-Faith Litigation, 2 Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont), No. 4, at 3 (Oct. 1988).
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30 (Harrison 1988 Supp.).
133. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (Vernon 1989).
134. 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws, H.B. No. 1028.
135. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33 (1947 & West Supp. 1989).
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judges."' 3 6 Moreover, statutory reform at the state level also functions
to limit the borrower's ability to bring a cause of action against its
lender. The financial community should regard these developments as a
positive sign in stemming the flow of lender liability. However, lenders
should also take heed of the lesson that courts will no longer tolerate
intemperate conduct by a lender when dealing with its borrower. The
judicial and legislative developments discussed in this note by no means
indicate that lenders are now magically insulated from liability. "It is a
well-recognized phenomenon that the thrust of legal decisions shift like
the ocean from high tide to low but then in proper season and time shift
back again to high."' 3 7 While lenders may be enjoying a respite from
the tidal wave of lender liability they must be ever vigilant that their
conduct does not give rise to a cause of action under the expanding
doctrine of lender liability.
William N. Medlock

136. New, York Court of Appeals Reverses Punitive Damage Auard Against Chase Manhattan, 2
Lender Liability L. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont), No. 9, at 2 (Mar. 1989).
137. Hellman, In the Court s the High Tide of Lender LiabilitY May Be Receding, American
Banker, April 4, 1989, at 17.

